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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION 
The caption of this case contains the names of all 
parties to the action. 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3) (j) (1992 Replacement Volume) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. ISSUES. 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Are "claims made" insurance policies (as 
distinguished from "occurrence" type polices) invalid in Utah on 
public policy grounds where such policies are used to provide 
professional liability coverage? 
2. Even if a claim had been made during the policy 
period of the professional liability policy in question, is 
coverage properly denied where timely notice of the claim was not 
given to the insurance company under the circumstances of this 
case? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The Supreme Court should view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the appellant. No deference is given to the trial 
court's conclusions of law; those conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 
(Utah 1989). 
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C CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE. 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
In an earlier case, plaintiff/appellant, AOK Lands, Inc. 
("AOK"), obtained a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title and 
Abstract Company ("Utah Title"). Utah Title had formerly been 
insured under two successive one-year errors and omissions policies 
issued by defendant/appellee Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance 
Company ("Mutual Fire"), acting through its agent, 
defendant/appellee Shand, Morahan & Company ("Shand Morahan"). AOK 
then commenced this action, claiming that it is entitled to recover 
the policy limits from defendants in partial satisfaction of AOK's 
judgment against Utah Title. 
The trial court granted defendants/appellees7 motion for 
summary judgment, finding that there is no issue as to any material 
fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on both of the grounds set forth in defendants' motion: (1) 
that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made until after 
the "claims made" insurance policies issued by defendants had 
expired and that said claim was therefore not covered under the 
policies, and (2) that defendants were prejudiced by not having 
been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim against Utah 
Title as required by the policies and that said claim was, for that 
reason also, not covered by the policies. All claims of plaintiff 
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as set forth in the complaint were therefore dismissed with 
prejudice. (Order and Judgment of the trial court, Record at 169-
70. Said Order and Judgment are attached hereto in the Addendum.) 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The following facts were set forth in the lower court in 
the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Record at 28-32.) None of these facts was controverted 
by plaintiff in its Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Record at 86-88.) 
1. Mutual Fire, acting through its agent, Shand Morahan, 
issued two successive errors and omissions insurance policies to 
Utah Title. The first policy was for the one year period from 
February 5, 1976 to February 5, 1977, and the second policy was for 
the one year period of February 5, 1977 to February 5, 1978. 
(Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. i, Record at 
41-43. Those two insurance policies are attached as Exhibits "A" 
and "B" to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents. Record at 48-b6 (first 
policy) and 57-65 (second policy). Those two policies are also 
included as the last two documents in the Addendum which is 
attached to the Brief of Appellant.) 
2. Each of the two insurance policies was a "claims 
made" policy. Each policy states: "This policy applies to CLAIMS 
FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD arising 
from professional services performed . . . ." (Emphasis in 
original.) In the second policy (which is the one closest in time 
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to the occasion when plaintiff later made a claim against Utah 
Title) that language appears toward the bottom of the third page of 
that policy. (Record at 59.) That page is a one page 
"Endorsement" which is entitled "AMENDMENT - THE COVERAGE." Even 
though that one page endorsement modified several provisions of the 
section entitled "The Coverage" in the main body of the policy, 
that Endorsement did not make any change in the "CLAIMS MADE" 
language quoted above. That same language therefore appears also 
in the main body of the policy, in paragraph 1 under the heading 
"The Coverage." (Record at 62.) 
3. Plaintiff alleges that Utah Title committed a 
negligent act in December 1977 in handling a real estate 
transaction, causing damage to plaintiff, but plaintiff did not 
discover Utah Title's negligence until June or July 1979 and did 
not file a complaint against Utah Title until December 1979. Thus 
plaintiff did not make a claim against Utah Title until some time 
between June 1979 and December 1979. (Paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint in this present action [Record at 1-2], and 
Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 1. [Record at 
67].) Plaintiff further admitted these facts in Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
86-87.) 
4. Therefore, plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was 
not made until 16 to 22 months after the February 5, 1978 
expiration date of the second "claims made" policy. 
5. In the one page Endorsement (referred to in paragraph 
4 
2 above) to the second policy, it is also stated that "it is a 
condition precedent to coverage under this policy that all claims 
be reported in compliance with the provisions of section CLAIMS 1 -
Notice of Claim or Suit." (Record at 59.) And in that section in 
the body of the policy under the heading "Claims" it is stated: 
i. Notice of claim or suit; The Insured 
shall, as a condition precedent to their right 
to the protection afforded by this insurance, 
give to the Company as soon as practicable, 
notice 
(a) of any claim made against them 
. . . . 
In the event claim is made or suit is brought 
against the Insured, the Insured shall 
IMMEDIATELY forward to the Company every 
demand, notice, summons or other process 
received by him or his representatives. 
(Record at 63-64; emphasis in original.) 
b. Even though plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was 
made by December 1979, when plaintiff filed its complaint against 
Utah Title, neither Utah Title nor plaintiff nor anyone else ever 
gave notice to Mutual Fire (the insurer) nor to Shand Morahan 
(which was Mutual Fire's agent in handling claims) until June 1988 
when plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Echard, sent to defendant Shand 
Morahan a letter dated June 3, 1988 in which he gave notice to 
defendants (1) of Utah Title's 1977 negligence, (2) of plaintiff's 
action against Utah Title commenced in 1979, and (3) of plaintiff's 
1988 judgment against Utah Title, and demanded that defendants pay 
the policy limits toward that judgment. That notice to defendants 
was thus not given until eight years of litigation, including two 
trials, had transpired between plaintiff and Utah Title, and 
plaintiff had recovered a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title. 
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(Letter dated June 3, 1988 from Robert A. Echard to Shand Morahan 
attached as an exhibit to plaintiff's Response to Defendants' First 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
[Record at 67, 76]; Affidavit of George M. Grulke [Record at 77-
82]); paragraph 5 on page 3 of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment [Record at 86, 88]. The Affidavit of 
Mr. Grulke is attached hereto in the Addendum. 
Because plaintiff, in its Response to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Record at 86-88) did not contest any of the 
foregoing facts which were set forth in the Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at 28-32), 
plaintiff is deemed to have admitted those facts pursuant to Rule 
4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which 
states: "All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement." Rule 
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that a 
party against whom a motion for summary judgment has been made, 
must, in his response, "set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
C. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
1. An "occurrence" type of policy generally provides 
coverage for a negligent act committed during the policy period, no 
matter when the claim is brought. In contrast, a "claims made" 
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policy covers claims made during the policy period, regardless of 
when the negligent act was committed. The policies involved in the 
instant case were clearly claims made policies that covered "claims 
first made against the insured during the policy period", The 
claim made by plaintiff against the insured, Utah Title, was not 
made until 16 to 22 months after the policy had expired, and those 
claims are therefore not covered by the policy. 
2. The validity of claims made policies has been upheld 
by numerous coiirts. The plaintiff has not cited a single case in 
which a court has held invalid a typical claims made insurance 
policy (the type of policy involved in the instant case). 
3. The claims made policy is ie form of insurance 
generally used to provide malpractice coverage to professionals. 
In the professional malpractice area, negligent acts are often not 
discovered ui iti 1 y ears later, and the I ise of "occurrence" po] Icies 
therefore leads to a long tail of exposure for insurance companies 
that makes it difficult to calculate risks and premiums. The use 
of claims made policies has stabilized the market in errors ai id 
omissions coverage. If claims made policies (limiting coverage to 
claims made during the policy period) were held to be invalid (as 
urged by plaintiff/appellant) there could be serious repercussions 
in the insurance industry in this state and uncertainty as to the 
continued availability of malpractice insurance for professionals. 
4. Utah cases cited by plaintiff in wlurh statutes of 
repose have been held unconstitutional based on the open courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution (Article I, Section 11), are not 
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applicable to claims made insurance policies• 
5. The insurance policies in question provided that as 
a "condition precedent" to the insured's right to the protection of 
the policy, the insured shall give notice to the company "as soon 
as practicable" of any claim made against the insured, and in the 
event suit is brought the insured shall "immediately forward to the 
company" the summons and other suit documents received by the 
insured. In this case the insured (Utah Title) never gave notice 
to the company of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title. The only 
notice the company (the defendants herein) ever received was from 
plaintiff's attorney, and that notice was not given until more than 
eight years after the plaintiff's claim was made against the 
insured and not until after the plaintiff had recovered judgment 
against the insured (after eight years of litigation and two 
trials). Under the Utah case of Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), there was no coverage under 
the policy because of failure to comply with the notice provision 
and the obvious prejudice to the insured resulting from such 
failure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY, THERE IS NO COVERAGE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST UTAH TITLE. 
Nothing would seem to be more clear than the conclusion 
that if a policy states that it only covers claims made during the 
policy period, then claims made after the policy period are not 
covered. Because it is so obvious, one would not expect to find 
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much litigation on the subject. Nevertheless, there are some cases 
where former insureds have devised a variety of arguments in an 
attempt to extend coverage beyond the time clearly established 
the policy. An example is Stine v. Continental Cas. Co. . 349 
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1984), where plaintiff Stine, an architect, had 
been insured under two successive one year errors and omissions 
policies. Those policies covered his negligent acts "provided that 
claim therefor is first made against the insured during this policy 
period reported i i writing to the Company during this policy 
period within 60 days after the expiration of this policy 
period." (349 N.W.2d at 129; emphasis in original.) 
Over two years after the termination date of the second 
policy, Stine was sued for negligent acts that may have occurred 
during the period that his insurance was in force, and Stine 
promptly gave notice t: :: the insurance company of the s "i i i t a i id 
requested that the company defend him. The company refused to do 
so because the claim was not made during the policy period as 
required by the "claims made" provision of the policy. Stine then 
filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to compel the company 
to defend him. 
Stine argued that even though he had not g. i ven the 
company notice of the claim against him within sixty days after the 
expiration of the policy period as required by the policy, his 
failure to give notice was excused Michigan statute that 
provided that "failure to give any notice required to be given by 
such policy within the time specified therein shall not invalidate 
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any claim made by the insured if it shall be shown not to have been 
reasonably possible to give such notice within the prescribed time 
and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably possible." 
(349 N.W.2d at 129, footnote 1.) 
The insurance company's response was that it was denying 
coverage, not because of the timeliness of Stine's notice of the 
claim against him, but because "by its terms, the policy provided 
no coverage for claims made against the insured after the 
expiration of the policy period." (349 N.W.2d at 129.) 
The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, 
rendered judgment for the insurance company. The court 
distinguished between a "claims made" policy and an "occurrence" 
policy as follows: 
As a general proposition . . . a "discovery" 
or "claims made" policy is one in which 
indemnity is provided no matter when the 
alleged . . . negligence occurred, provided 
the misdeed complained of is discovered and 
the claim for indemnity is made against the 
insurer during the policy period. 
An "occurrence" insurance policy, on the other 
hand, generally is one in which indemnity is 
provided no matter when the claim is brought 
for the misdeed complained of, provided it 
occurred during the policy period. 
Or, as the United States Supreme Court put it: 
"An 'occurrence7 policy protects the 
policy holder from liability for any act 
done while the policy is in effect, 
whereas a 'claims made' policy protects 
the holder only against claims made 
during the life of the policy." 
(Citation omitted.) 
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(349 N.W.2d at 130-31; emphasis in original.) The court ruled that 
in accordance with the plain language of the policy, it provided 
coverage only for a claim made against the plaintiff Stine during 
the policy period. Because the claim was made after the policy 
period, there was no coverage. Accord, Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. 
Gannon, 774 P.2d 30 (Wash. App. 1989). 
Plaintiff herein argues that the six year statute of 
limitations on written contracts (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2)) 
and/or the four year statute of limitations on negligence actions 
(Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25) should apply to the claims made policy 
in question. Plaintiff then states: "Consequently, a claim for 
negligence or a claim on a written insurance policy could be 
maintained within four years or six years. The lawsuit of the 
appellant against Utah Title and Abstract Company was filed within 
two years from the date of the insurance policy and the negligent 
act." (Plaintiff/appellant's Brief at 8.) 
However, plaintiff's lawsuit that was dismissed was not 
his suit against Utah Title, but his suit against Shand Morahan and 
Mutual Fire, and that latter suit was not commenced within four 
years nor even within six years "from the date of the insurance 
policy and the negligent act." All that is beside the point, 
however. Plaintiff's suit against these defendants was not 
dismissed because he filed his cause of action too late; it was 
because, as a matter of law, he never had a cause of action under 
the insurance contract. Because the insurance policy provided no 
coverage of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title, it doesn't matter 
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when plaintiff filed his suit; it still should be dismissed as a 
matter of law. 
The two insurance policies in the instant case were 
"claims made" policies that clearly do not provide coverage for any 
claim that was first made after the policy period. Because 
plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made until 16 to 22 
months after the last policy expired, that claim is not covered by 
either policy. Therefore, defendants have no liability either to 
the former insured, Utah Title, or to plaintiff, who is the 
judgment creditor of Utah Title. 
II. "CLAIMS MADE" INSURANCE POLICIES (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM 
"OCCURRENCE" TYPE POLICIES) , AS USED TO PROVIDE 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE, SHOULD NOT BE HELD 
INVALID IN UTAH ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS. 
A. Cases Dealing With Claims Made Policies. 
As discussed below, numerous cases in numerous 
jurisdictions have upheld the validity of claims made insurance 
policies. The only case cited by plaintiff that held that there 
was coverage under a "claims made" liability policy where the claim 
was not made until after the policy expired is Sparks v. St. Paul 
Ins. Co. , 495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985) (discussed on pages 18-23 of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief). But that case dealt with an unusual 
type of claims made policy (which was a professional liability 
policy issued to an attorney) that was much more restrictive than 
the standard claims made policy because it excluded coverage for 
any act of negligence occurring before the date that the insurance 
company issued its first policy to the attorney. The court 
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observed that "unlike the standard Claims made' policy . . .St. 
Paul's policy provided no retroactive coverage whatsoever during 
its first year." (Sparks, supra at 408.) The policy thus 
"combines the worst features of 'occurrence' and 'claims made' 
policies and the best of neither." (Id. at 414.) 
That Sparks case has very limited application as 
evidenced by the fact that the same court - the New Jersey Supreme 
Court - on the same day it decided the Sparks case, also decided 
the case of Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395 
(N.J. 1985), in which the court upheld a more typical type of 
claims made policy. The plaintiff, Zuckerman, was an attorney who 
had been insured under a professional liability policy whose 
coverage was limited to "claims made against the insured and 
actually communicated to the company during the policy period." 
Id. at 396. (That policy was therefore more restrictive in 
coverage than the policy in the instant case, which does not 
require that the claim be communicated to the company during the 
policy period but only that it be communicated "as soon as 
practicable." Of course the claim itself needs to have been made 
against the insured during the policy period.) Ten months after 
the policy expired, Zuckerman notified the insurance company of a 
claim that had been made against him, but the company denied 
coverage. Zuckerman brought suit to compel the company to 
indemnify him, but the court decided the case in favor of the 
insurance company, holding that there were no considerations of 
public policy that should prevent the "claims made" limitation in 
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the policy from being enforced literally, and that the carrier was 
therefore relieved from liability when notification of a claim was 
not given until after the policy expired. 
The court noted that, unlike the Sparks case, the policy 
in Zuckerman provided broad retroactive coverage - it covered 
negligent acts committed even before commencement of the policy, 
subject only to the standard exception (which the court described 
as reasonable) of prior conduct which the insured knew, or could 
have reasonably foreseen, might lead to a claim or suit. 
(Zuckerman. supra at 403.) The court observed that "in the vast 
majority of cases in which 'claims made' policies have been 
challenged, their validity has been upheld by both federal and 
state courts. Many courts have explicitly held that 'claims made' 
policies do not offend public policy." (Id. at 400; citations 
omitted; emphasis added.) 
The plaintiff in Zuckerman argued (similar to the 
arguments made by plaintiff in the instant case) that "on public 
policy grounds the [policy's] coverage limitations should not 
strictly be enforced absent appreciable prejudice to respondent 
because of the late notification." (Id. at 404.) The court 
rejected that argument, pointing out that cases which excuse an 
insured in giving late notice of a claim to the insurance company 
deal with occurrence type policies, where the notice requirement 
does "not define the coverage provided by the policy but rather was 
included to aid the insurance carrier in investigating, settling, 
and defending claims. . . . Accordingly, the requirement of notice 
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in an occurrence policy is subsidiary to the event that invokes 
coverage, and the conditions relating to giving notice should be 
liberally and practically construed," (Id, at 406-) The court 
then stated: 
By contrast, the event that invokes coverage 
under a "claims made" policy is transmittal of 
notice of the claim to the insurance carrier. 
In exchange for limiting coverage only to 
claims made during the policy period, the 
carrier provides the insured with retroactive 
coverage for errors and omissions that took 
place prior to the policy period. Thus, an 
extension of the notice period in a "claims 
made" policy constitutes an unbargained-for 
expansion of coverage, gratis, resulting in 
the insurance company's exposure to a risk 
substantially broader than that expressly 
insured against in the policy. Obviously, 
such an expansion in the coverage provided by 
"claims made" policies would significantly 
affect both the actuarial basis upon which 
premiums have been calculated and, 
consequently, the cost of "claims made" 
insurance. So material a modification in the 
terms of this form of insurance widely used to 
provide professional liability coverage both 
in this State and throughout the country would 
be inequitable and unjustified. 
(Id. at 406.) 
The insurance policy in the instant case is similar to 
the claims made policy in Zuckerman in that it provides coverage 
not only for negligent acts committed during the policy period but 
also provides retroactive coverage for acts committed before the 
effective date of the policy (except such acts as the insured knew 
might result in a claim - the same standard exception as approved 
in Zuckerman). Therefore, instead of the Sparks case, cited by 
plaintiff, being authority against the defendants' position in the 
instant case, it is clear that under the Sparks and Zuckerman 
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cases, read together, the "claims made" policy in the instant case 
would be upheld by the New Jersey court that decided those cases. 
In other words, the policy issued to Utah Title would be held not 
to cover claims made against Utah Title after the policy expired. 
Plaintiff alleges that the negligent acts of Utah Title 
occurred during the policy period, but plaintiff admits that no 
claim was made against Utah Title until after the policy had 
expired. Cases in that category (with respect to claims made 
policies) are collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R. 4th 382 (1985), in 
§16(a) and §16(b) (pages 457-67) of that Annotation. As seen from 
the cases collected in §16(b), claims made policies were upheld in 
cases decided in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island and (in the 1992 
Supplement to 37 A.L.R. 4th) California, Massachusetts, Texas, 
Washington and Wisconsin, and in federal cases construing the laws 
of Alabama, California, Mississippi and Oregon. In contrast, the 
"claims made" limitation was held invalid only in cases decided in 
California, Michigan, New Jersey and New York (collected in §16(a) 
of that Annotation), but the unusual facts of those minority cases, 
especially when viewed in light of other decisions in those same 
jurisdictions, indicate that even those four jurisdictions would 
uphold a typical claims made policy (the type of policy found in 
the instant case): 
1. The three California cases cited in §16(a) of that 
A.L.R. Annotation are all based on similar, ambiguous wording 
present in the claims made policies involved in those cases and not 
16 
present in the policy in the instant case. The California policy 
covered claims which "may be made" against the insured during the 
policy period instead of the more typical language: "This policy 
applies to claims first made against the insured during the policy 
period" as contained in the policy in the instant case. Also, 
later California cases have upheld claims made policies that did 
not have that ambiguity in it. (See Burns v. International Ins. 
Co.. 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law); VTN 
Consol. Inc. v. Northbrook Ins. Co.. 92 Cal. App. 3d 888, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 172 (Ct. App. 1979).) 
2. The Michigan intermediate appellate court decision in 
Stine v. Continental Cas. Co., 315 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. App. 1982) , 
cited in §16(a) of the A.L.R. Annotation as representing a minority 
position (upholding coverage even when a claim was not made until 
after expiration of the policy period) was reversed on appeal to 
the Michigan Supreme Court, and is, in fact, the same case 
discussed on pages 9-11 hereof. 
3. The New Jersey intermediate appellate court decision 
in Jones v. Continental Cas. Co.. 303 A.2d 91 (N.J. Super.Ct. 
1973), cited in §16(a) of that A.L.R. Annotation, dealt with a 
claims made policy that was very restrictive in its retroactive 
coverage; it insured prior negligent acts only if "insured by this 
Company under [a] prior policy." Twelve years later the New Jersey 
Supreme Court commented that Jones was "the only reported case in 
which a 'claims made' policy was invalidated because of its lack of 
retroactive coverage" and that "other state and federal courts 
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confronted with 'claims made' policies providing limited or no 
retroactive coverage have declined to follow Jones." (Sparks v. 
St. Paul Ins. Co. . 495 A.2d 406, 410-11 (N.J. 1985).) As discussed 
above, the later case of Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. , 
495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), makes it clear that New Jersey would 
uphold the more typical form of claims made policy (the type 
involved in the instant case). 
4. Finally, the New York case cited in §16(a) of that 
A.L.R. Annotation, Heen & Flint Assoc, v. Travelers Indemnity Co.. 
400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup.Ct., Monroe Co., 1977), was a memorandum 
decision by a single trial court judge, who held that coverage 
existed (though a claim was not made until after the policy 
expired) based on the unusual facts of that case - that the insured 
was not able to obtain continued coverage from his carrier (because 
the carrier ceased writing professional liability insurance 
policies in New York) and was not able to obtain a replacement 
policy from any other carrier with respect to the negligent act in 
question. 
Thus, of all of the cases collected in Annot. 37 A.L.R. 
4th 382 (1985) , there appears not to be a single case that supports 
plaintiff's contention in the instant case that Utah Title should 
be covered under the claims made policy even though plaintiff's 
claim against Utah Title was not made until after the policy 
expired. 
On pages 10-14 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief, 16 cases 
are cited. It appears that all of those cases cited by plaintiff 
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involved an "occurrence" type policy and not a "claims made" 
policy. That conclusion appears certain for two reasons: (1) the 
insurance policies involved in those cases did not include any 
professional liability policies but instead involved life 
insurance, fire insurance, automobile insurance, public liability 
insurance for personal injury and a fidelity bond issued to a 
savings and loan company. In those types of insurance, occurrence 
policies are typically used. (2) None of those cases dealt with 
the issue of whether a claims made policy could be held to cover a 
claim made after the policy expired; in fact, none of those cases 
even referred to the policy involved as being a claims made policy. 
Several of those cases cited by plaintiff held that an 
insured and his insurer cannot agree between themselves that the 
policy does not cover a particular claim, and thereby defeat 
whatever rights an injured party may have to be compensated by 
insurance proceeds. That situation obviously is not involved in 
the instant case. 
Others of those cases cited by plaintiff dealt with the 
issue of whether the insured7s late notice to the insurance company 
of the claim would be excused, and some of those cases held that 
such late notice would not be grounds for denial of coverage under 
the policy unless the insurance company could show prejudice. But 
that "notice - prejudice" rule is often not applicable to claims 
made insurance policies for the following reasons: 
1. If the claim against the insured is not made during 
the policy period, it is immaterial whether or not the insured gave 
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timely notice of the claim to the insurance company. The claim is 
still not covered. 
2. Many claims made policies provide coverage only for 
claims where both (1) the claim itself is made against the insured 
during the policy period and (2) notice of the claim is also given 
to the insurer during the policy period. In those case the "notice 
- prejudice" rule has no application. Late notice cannot be 
excused because, as pointed out in Zuckerman v. National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. . 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985)- (discussed on pages 13-16 
above), the giving of notice to the insurance company is the actual 
event that "invokes coverage," as distinguished from an occurrence 
policy where the notice requirement does not define the coverage 
but is merely to enable the insurance company to investigate, 
defend and settle the claim). (See Burns v. International Ins. 
Co. , 929 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991), "the 'notice - prejudice' 
rule does not apply to claims-made policies.") 
Finally, even if the "notice - prejudice" rule were held 
to apply in the instant case, the facts regarding the lack of 
notice are so egregious that prejudice to the insurance company is 
clearly enormous. 
In summary, virtually unanimous case law has upheld the 
validity of claims made insurance policies. 
B. Public Policy Considerations in Support of Claims 
Made Policies. 
The court in Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
495 A. 2d 395 (N.J. 1985) (discussed on pages 13-16 hereof), 
reviewed the reasons for the development and increasing use of 
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claims made policies. "Occurrence" policies, which were once the 
standard form of insurance, are now ordinarily used with respect to 
events whose occurrence is usually easy to ascertain and where 
claims are usually made within a reasonably short time after the 
event (death, fire, collision, etc.). But occurrence policies 
present difficult underwriting problems with certain kinds of 
injuries and the negligence that causes those injuries, which may 
not be discovered until years after they occur, such as 
professional malpractice, environmental hazards and defective 
products. Under an occurrence policy those risks result in a "long 
tail" of exposure to the carrier, long after the policy expires, 
and over the years claims have increased in number and amount far 
beyond what the underwriters could have originally estimated. 
These problems have led, over the past several decades, to the 
wide-spread use of "claims made" policies instead of "occurrence" 
policies with respect to those kinds of risks. (See Zuckerman, 
supra at 398-401. 
One commentator suggested that the use of "claims made" 
policies has stabilized the insurance market in errors and 
omissions coverage and that companies attempting to write 
"occurrence" type policies with respect to errors and omissions 
insurance have not been able to remain in the marketplace. (D. 
Shand, "Is Your Policy on a 'Claims Made' Basis?," Weekly 
Underwriter. Sept. 15, 1973, at 8, quoted in Zuckerman, supra at 
400.) 
The Zuckerman case details some of the advantages, both 
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to insureds and to insurance carriers, that claims made policies 
have over occurrence policies: 
The obvious advantage to the underwriter 
issuing "claims made" policies is the ability 
to calculate risks and premiums with greater 
exactitude since the insurer's exposure ends 
at a fixed point, usually the policy 
termination date. . . . This may result in 
lower rates for the insured. . . . A corollary 
benefit to the insured is that since coverage 
is purchased on a contemporary basis, it can 
afford protection in current dollars for 
liability that may be based on negligence that 
occurred years earlier. . . . 
Obviously, it is not against the public 
interest that professional practitioners, for 
example, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and 
architects, be able to obtain insurance on a 
reasonably structured "claims made" basis, 
rather than being left in the position of 
being able to obtain insurance only on an 
"occurrence" basis at what may perhaps be 
exorbitant rates that few could afford. 
(Id. at 399-401.) 
In the instant case, if plaintiff's contention were 
accepted - that a claims made policy should cover claims made after 
the policy expires, in spite of the specific policy language to the 
contrary - it would mean that the typical claims made policy issued 
in this state would be judicially converted into an occurrence 
policy; in fact it would go further than that because claims made 
policies (unlike occurrence policies) usually cover past acts of 
negligence. If claims made policies were then construed to cover 
future claims also, such policies would be judicially converted 
into a liability policy broader in coverage than either a claims 
made or an occurrence policy. Such a result would certainly cause 
serious repercussions in the insurance industry in this state. It 
22 
would be difficult for insurance companies to calculate risks and 
premiums with any degree of certainty; premium rates would 
obviously have to be increased, and the future of claims made 
policies would be uncertain. Even plaintiff/appellant acknowledges 
that holding claims made policies to be invalid would "have a 
significant impact on professional insurance coverage in the 
future." (Appellant's Docketing Statement, page 6.) 
With respect to policies already issued - even those 
which were issued and expired years ago, like the policy in the 
instant case - the insurance companies would be subject to 
dramatically increased exposure that they did not anticipate and 
for which no premium was calculated, and the insureds under those 
policies (or their judgment creditors) would thus receive a 
windfall in protection for which the insured did not pay. 
On page 21 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief he argues that 
the claims made policy in the instant case does not have adequate 
coverage of negligent acts occurring prior to the effective date of 
the policy because it excludes coverage for claims, and for 
negligent acts that might result in claims, that the insured knows 
about at the time he applies for the insurance. But that is a 
standard provision in a claims made policy, and plaintiff points to 
no case where a court has objected to that clause or held a claims 
made policy to be invalid because of it. (See e.g., Zuckerman v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), where that 
"knowledge of prior negligence" clause is approved.) 
If persons who render professional services and who 
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become aware of claims which are about to be asserted against them, 
have the right to run out and buy insurance that will pay to defend 
them and to indemnify them from those claims, it would be 
tantamount to persons who find they are terminally ill then buying 
a large amount of life insurance• The insurance industry could go 
broke quickly if it was forced to write that kind of business. 
In summary, claims made policies fill an important need 
to provide insurance for professional malpractice, and public 
policy considerations would indicate that such policies should be 
upheld and should continue to be available in the marketplace. 
C. Cases Dealing With Statutes of Repose and The Open 
Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution Are 
Inapplicable. 
Plaintiff attempts to make up for its lack of any direct 
case authority by the novel argument that a claims made insurance 
policy is similar to a statute of repose and should be held 
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution (the "open courts" clause) and under the case of Berry 
ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), 
and other Utah cases which have applied the open courts clause. 
The Berry case held a statute of repose under the Utah Products 
Liability Act to be unconstitutional under the Utah open courts 
clause. Plaintiff also cites Horton v. Goldminer/s Daughter. 785 
P. 2d 1087 (Utah 1989), which held a statute of repose for 
architects and builders to be unconstitutional under the Utah open 
courts clause, and Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989), which held that a statute limiting damages, as applied 
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for the benefit of University Hospital, was unconstitutional under 
the open courts clause. 
The statute of repose cases dealt with the issue of 
whether a cause of action could constitutionally be barred by a 
statute that bars an action after a specified time where that time 
begins to run from some event other than the injury that gives rise 
to the cause of action. For example, the statute of repose dealt 
with in the Berrv case purported to bar an action, regardless of 
when the injury from a defective product occurred, if the action 
was not brought within six years of the initial purchase of the 
product and within 10 years of the date of its manufacture. 
In contrast to a statute of repose issue (whether a party 
who has a cause of action may be barred from commencing a suit to 
pursue his cause of action), plaintiff in the instant case never 
had a cause of action against the defendants for the simple reason 
that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made within the 
policy period and was not, therefore, covered by the policy. 
These statute of repose cases and the open courts clause 
therefore have no applicability to the instant case. 
III. THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY BECAUSE NOTICE OF 
THE CLAIM WAS NOT GIVEN TO THE INSURED AS REQUIRED BY THE 
POLICY. 
As a separate and independent ground, summary judgment 
was granted to defendants because they were prejudiced by not 
having been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim 
against Utah Title as required by the policy. (Order and Judgment 
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of the trial court, Record at 169-170.) 
That judgment should be affirmed based on the holding in 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
1987) . That case is squarely in point with the facts of the 
instant case, even including the context in which the case came to 
the Supreme Court (an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant insurance company). 
In Busch, State Farm issued a liability insurance policy 
in 1980 to plaintiff, a land developer. That same year plaintiff 
was sued for damages it had caused in 1978 to land adjacent to one 
of its developments. The case was tried to a jury, and in 1982 a 
$29,000 judgment was entered against plaintiff. In 1983 plaintiff, 
for the first time, notified State Farm of the claim and demanded 
indemnity under the policy. Thus notice to State Farm was not 
given until five years after the negligent act occurred, three 
years after the lawsuit had been filed against plaintiff, and not 
until after the suit had been tried and a judgment rendered. State 
Farm declined coverage under its policy because plaintiff had not 
complied with the notice requirement of the policy, which stated: 
In the event of an occurrence, written 
notice . . . shall be given by or for the 
Insured to the Company . . . as soon as 
practicable. 
If claim is made or suit is brought against 
the Insured, the Insured shall immediately 
forward to the Company every demand, notice, 
summons or other process received by him or 
his representative. 
(743 P.2d at 1218.) (That language is virtually identical to the 
policy language in the instant case, quoted in paragraph 5 under 
26 
the "Statement of Facts" section above.) 
The trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary 
judgment, and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that, 
"Clearly, under the facts of this case, written notice was not 
given to defendants as soon as practicable" as required by the 
policy. (743 P.2d at 1218.) Plaintiff in that case argued that 
despite its failure to comply with the notice provisions of the 
policy, the case should not have been dismissed unless the 
insurance company showed that actual prejudice resulted from the 
lack of notice. The court's response was that, regardless of 
whether actual prejudice need be shown (an issue the court chose 
not to decide) , such prejudice was amply shown in the facts, 
established by the affidavit of State Farm's claims manager, that 
because of the late notice the insurance company had not had the 
opportunity to investigate and possibly settle the claim or to 
employ its own counsel to defend the lawsuit. 
The facts of the instant case are even more onerous and 
prejudicial to the defendant insurance company than in the Busch 
case. Here the insurance company never did receive notice of the 
claim from its insured (most likely because the insured, Utah 
Title, knew that the two policies had expired before plaintiff made 
a claim against Utah Title). The notice the insurance company 
eventually got was from the insured's judgment creditor, the 
plaintiff in this action, but that notice was not given until (1) 
more than 10 years after the negligent act giving rise to the 
claim, (2) over eight years after the claim was made, (3) after 
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eight years of litigation had ensued, and (4) five months after 
judgment had been entered against the insured. And as stated by 
George Grulke, the claims manager for Shand Morahan, in his 
affidavit filed in support of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment: 
Because of the absence of any notice to 
Shand Morahan until June 1988, Mutual Fire and 
Shand Morahan were deprived of the opportunity 
to do the kinds of things that we routinely do 
in handling claims or to be involved in any 
way in the claim of AOK Lands. We had no 
opportunity to review the claim, to examine 
the documents that Utah Title was alleged to 
have been negligent in handling or drafting, 
to interview and take statements of witnesses, 
to review issues of insurance coverage of Utah 
Title, to adjust and possibly settle the 
claim, to retain an attorney to represent Utah 
Title in the law suit filed by AOK Lands, or 
to participate in any way in the defense of 
that suit. 
(Paragraph 8 of Mr. Grulke's Affidavit; Record at 77, 80.) A copy 
of Mr. Grulke's Affidavit is attached in the Addendum hereto. 
It is hard to imagine a more extreme case of non-
compliance with the notice provision of the insurance agreement and 
of prejudice to the insurance company, and the trial court in the 
instant case accordingly found that the defendants were prejudiced 
by not having been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim 
against Utah Title. (Order and Judgment of the trial court, Record 
at 169-70.) There was therefore no coverage under either policy 
because the coverage was expressly conditioned upon claims being 
promptly reported. 
Plaintiff/appellant states that "the transcript of the 
lower court's decision" attached to his Brief "demonstrates that 
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Judge Stanton M. Taylor did not give any serious considerations to 
the legal or factual issues raised in the lower court. Plaintiff 
also claims that the lower court "failed to give the appellant an 
opportunity to discover whether or not the insurance company had 
received constructive or actual knowledge of the claim which was 
filed by the appellant against Utah Title." (Plaintiff/appellant's 
Brief at 14.) Those statements are without support in the record 
as indicated by the following: 
1. The hearing before the trial court continued for 
probably 20 to 30 minutes or longer, yet plaintiff/appellant has 
elected to obtain and file with its Brief a partial transcript of 
only the last three or four minutes of that hearing. That is not 
adequate to indicate what the trial court did or did not consider. 
2. At the time of the trial court hearing on August 19, 
1991, on defendants' summary judgment motion, the court had before 
it the extensive memorandums of defendants and of plaintiff in 
support of and in opposition to, respectively, defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. (Record at 28 [Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment], 86 [Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Response], and 117 [Defendants' Reply Memorandum].) 
3. The Order and Judgment of the trial court stated that 
the court had considered the various memorandums and affidavits, 
"the pleadings and record in this case and the arguments of 
counsel" (Record at 169), and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Judge Taylor did not duly consider those matters. 
4. Neither at the trial court nor in this appeal has 
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plaintiff pointed to anything in the record that controverts any of 
the facts set forth by defendants in their Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and set forth by defendants 
in the Statement of Facts in this Brief. 
5. Plaintiff also made no request at the hearing before 
the trial court for more time to develop any further facts pursuant 
to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Even in Appellant's Brief before this court it has 
specifically admitted facts sufficient to justify the rendering of 
summary judgment against appellant, including the following: 
a. The last of the two claims made insurance 
policies issued by defendants to Utah Title expired February 5, 
1978. (Appellant's Brief at 7.) 
b. "The insurance policy specifically informed the 
insured, Utah Title. . . . that no claims made after the policy 
period which concluded on February 5, 1978, were covered by the 
insurance policy." (Appellant's Brief at 9.) 
c. Plaintiff did not even learn of Utah Title's 
negligence until the summer of 1979 (over 16 months after the 
claims made policy expired) and did not file suit against Utah 
Title until November or December 1979 (21 or 22 months after the 
latter of the two claims made policies expired). (Appellant's 
Brief at 4, 9.) 
d. After extensive litigation and five weeks of a 
bifurcated trial, plaintiff obtained judgment against Utah Title in 
January 1988. (Appellant's Brief at 2, 4.) 
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e. Plaintiff notified defendants of the judgment in 
June 1988. (Appellant's Brief at 2, 6, 12.) 
It is hard to imagine a case where there is so clearly no 
dispute as to the material facts, and if it appeared to plaintiff 
that Judge Taylor did not immerse himself in factual issues, it is 
probably because plaintiff never raised any factual issues. 
Plaintiff argues that the defendant insurance company is 
not prejudiced by failure to receive notice of plaintiff's claim 
against Utah Title and of the ongoing litigation between plaintiff 
and Utah Title because the "trial of the action between Utah Title 
and the appellant and the discovery conducted thereunder, should 
provide sufficient information to the appellees in the form of 
documentation, depositions, witnesses' testimony on record, etc." 
(Plaintiff/appellant's Brief at 14-15.) In other words, plaintiff 
is arguing that the insurance company is not prejudiced because 
even now, at this late date, it can go back and read the 
depositions and the transcript of the two trials that were held and 
find out all it wants to about what happened in the case! The 
fallacy of that argument is self evident. Is plaintiff suggesting 
that the defendant insurance company should now be able to go back 
and litigate with plaintiff in the present action the issue of 
whether Utah Title was negligent? Certainly plaintiff is not 
conceding that. Plaintiff's argument would effectively eliminate 
from insurance policies the provisions that insurance companies are 
entitled to notice of claims made against their insureds. 
On page 11 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief he argues that, 
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"The 'no action' clause of the insurance policy contradicts any 
notice of claim requirements." It does not follow that just 
because the insurance company could not be sued directly until a 
judgment was obtained against its insured, that somehow excuses the 
insured from having never given notice of the claim to its 
insurance company during all those years when plaintiff's claim 
against the insured was being litigated in the trial court. 
On page 12 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief, it argues 
that, "The appellant should not be penalized for Utah Title's 
failure to give notice as required under the insurance policy at 
issue. In fact, Utah Title had specifically represented to the 
appellant that it had no insurance coverage." 
If Utah Title did so represent, they would have made that 
representation in good faith (and correctly) . They had no 
insurance coverage because they had had a claims made policy, and 
they would obviously have known that the plaintiff's claim against 
them was not made during the policy period. Plaintiff itself 
acknowledges that Utah Title was "specifically informed" by the 
insurance policy itself "that no claims made after the policy 
period which concluded on February 5, 1978, were covered by the 
insurance policy." (Plaintiff/appellant's Brief at 9, last 
paragraph.) 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts are without dispute. This is a case 
that must be decided as a matter of law. 
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With summary judgment in this case having been granted on 
each of two separate grounds (prejudicial failure to give notice to 
defendants of the claim, and the claim not having been made until 
after the "claims made" policy expired), in order to reverse the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment, this court would, 
therefore, have to both: (1) overrule the Busch case (discussed on 
pages 26-27 hereof) on the issue of lack of notice, and (2) go 
against the virtually unanimous weight of authority by invalidating 
"claims made" insurance policies and thereby create a risk of 
serious disruption to the business of providing malpractice 
insurance to professionals. 
There is not only no genuine issue as to any material 
fact in this case, but there also appears to be no issue as to the 
controlling legal principles. The summary judgment granted to 
defendants should be affirmed. 
3 r J day of November, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEIK JENSEN &_ POWELL, P.C. 
W< - ^  >-' 
Richard L. EVTOS^ 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
— day of November, 
1992, ten copies of the Brief of Appellees have been mailed, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
and that four copies of the Brief of Appellees have been mailed, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Robert A. Echard 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
hMZi* *Vf Y^f^/^^A 
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ADDENDUM 
Richard L. Evans, Jr., #1016 
Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AOK LANDS, INC., : 
: ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and : E P * 1 JSSf 
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND : Civil No. 890903067CV 
INSURANCE CO., : 
: Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
Defendants. : 
The motion for summary judgment of defendants Shand, 
Morahan & Company ("Shand Morahan") and Mutual Fire, Marine & 
Inland Insurance Co. ("Mutual Fire") came on regularly for hearing 
before the court on August 19, 1991. Richard L. Evans of the firm 
of Christensen, Jensen & Powell appeared at the hearing as attorney 
for the defendants, and Robert A. Echard of the firm of Gridley, 
Echard & Ward appeared as attorney for the plaintiff. The court, 
having considered the motion and the memoranda and affidavit filed 
in support thereof, having considered the memorandum and affidavits 
filed in opposition to the motion, having considered the pleadings 
and record in this case and the arguments of counsel, being fully 
160 
advised and having heretofore directed this order, 
The court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that said defendants are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law on both of the grounds set forth in defendants' 
motion: (1) that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title, the former 
insured, was not made until after the "claims made" insurance 
policies issued by or on behalf of defendants had expired and that 
said claim was therefore not covered under the policies, and (2) 
that defendants were prejudiced by not having been provided with 
timely notice of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title as required 
by the policies and that said claim was, for that reason also, not 
covered by the policies. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendants' 
motion for summary judgment against plaintiff be, and the same 
hereby is, granted, and all claims of plaintiff asserted against 
defendants Shand Morahan and Mutual Fire as set forth in the 
complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
i/i ^i^/}^ 
DATED this IT day of August, 1991. 
/ 
BY THE COURT:
 ;
 r
 / 
/' 
Stanton M. Taylor 
District Court Judge 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the CI I day of August, 1991, 
a copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Robert A. Echard 
Gridley, Echard & Ward 
635 - 25th ^Stceet 
Ogden, Utah 84)l01 
~J*i*4 n c^*<\ L >vv jf^ vJL 
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Richard L. Evans, jr., #1016 
Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
CHRISTENSEN, JENS6N & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAY z Q raft 
AOK LANDS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and 
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GEORGE M. GRULKE 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890903067CV 
STATE OF ILLINOIS : 
COUNTY OF COOK : 
George M. Grulke, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am Claims Manager and Coordinator, Mutual Fire Claim 
Unit at Shand, Morahan & Company, Inc. ("Shand Morahan") whose 
address is Shand Morahan Plaza, Evanston, Illinois 60201. 
2. Shand Morahan provides, subject to underwriting 
management contracts, the management of special risk and 
professional liability lines of business for various insurers. 
This includes underwriting and claims handling. 
3. During the period of time beginning March 4, 1971 and 
continuing through December 31, 1990, Shand Morahan acted as the 
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underwriting manager for Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance 
Company ("Mutual Fire") with respect to the line of special risk 
business under which the two errors and omissions insurance 
policies involved in this case were issued to Utah Title & Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"). Those are policy No. CN 502107 covering 
the period from February 5, 1976 to February 5, 1977, and policy 
No. CN 502852 for the period from February 5, 1977 to February 5, 
1978. As part of Shand Morahan's duties as underwriting manager, 
Shand Morahan handled, on behalf of Mutual Fire, claims made 
against entities insured by Mutual Fire, and until Shand Morahan's 
role as underwriting manager for Mutual Fire ended on December 31, 
1990, part of my duties for Shand Morahan was to receive, review 
and evaluate initial loss notices, review coverage, establish claim 
files based upon loss reports received; arrange for appropriate 
investigation, defense and disposition of the claims. 
4. Because of Shand Morahan's role in handling claims, a 
provision was typically included in the "declarations" page of 
Mutual Fire policies, subject to the terms and conditions of the 
Underwriting Management Agreement between Shand Morahan and Mutual 
Fire, to the effect that all claims were to be reported directly to 
Shand Morahan, and giving Shand Morahan's address, and such a 
provision does, in fact, appear in the declarations page of each of 
the two policies involved in this case (referred to in paragraph 3 
above). However, even in those instances where insureds under 
Mutual Fire policies would overlook that provision and would send 
notices of claims made against them directly to Mutual Fire, the 
2 
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routine practice between Shand Morahan and Mutual Fire was that 
Mutual Fire would forward those notices of claims to Shand Morahan 
for handling. 
5. Consistent with the terms and conditions of the 
Underwriting Management Agreement, handling claims for Mutual Fire 
was a regularly conducted business activity of Shand Morahan. As 
part of that business activity I and other persons who worked with 
me and under my direction regularly and promptly kept records 
relating to claims made against Mutual Fire insureds, and we relied 
upon those records in performing our duties to see that claims were 
properly handled. Those records included notices received by Shand 
Morahan of claims made against Mutual Fire insureds, resulting 
investigations, correspondence, settlements, court proceedings and 
various other matters relating to said claims. 
6. I have reviewed Shand Morahan's claims records with 
respect to the two errors and omissions policies issued to Utah 
Title, as referred to in paragraph 3 above. I find that the first 
notice or information of any kind received by Shand Morahan with 
regard to the claim made by plaintiff, AOK Lands, Inc. ("AOK 
Lands") against Utah Title was a letter dated June 3, 1988 from 
Robert A. Echard, attorney for AOK Lands, to Shand Morahan. In 
that letter Mr. Echard informed Shand Morahan that, on behalf of 
AOK Lands, he had filed a complaint against Utah Title in 1979 and 
had obtained a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title and demanded 
that we pay the policy limits towards that judgment. That 
judgment, a copy of which he enclosed with that June 3, 1988 
3 
letter, was dated January 15, 1988, and it recited that two jury 
trials had been held. 
7. Thus, even though the claim of AOK Lands had apparently 
been made against Mutual Fire's insured, Utah Title, in 1979, our 
records indicate that Shand Morahan did not receive any notice of 
that claim from Utah Title or from AOK Lands or from anyone else 
until more than eight years later, after two trials had been held 
and a $400,000 judgment had been entered. 
8. Because of the absence of any notice to Shand Morahan 
until June 1988, Mutual Fire and Shand Morahan were deprived of the 
opportunity to do the kinds of things that we routinely do in 
handling claims or to be involved in any way in the claim of AOK 
Lands. We had no opportunity to review the claim, to examine the 
documents that Utah Title was alleged to have been negligent in 
handling or drafting, to interview and take statements of 
witnesses, to review issues of insurance coverage of Utah Title, to 
adjust and possibly settle the claim, to retain an attorney to 
represent Utah Title in the lawsuit filed by AOK Lands, or to 
participate in any way in the defense of that suit. As a result of 
the preceding, it was impossible for us to conduct an 
investigation, engage counsel to defend the allegations of the 
complaint and, as such, it was prejudicial to the interest of Shand 
Morahan and Mutual Fire. 
4 
Dated this lb*** day of May, 1991, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of May, 1991. 
> 
Notary Public ,>'/ 
My Commission expires: 
OFFICIAL SEAL 
CARL SCHULZ JR. 
I NOTARY PUBLIC. STATE OF ILLINOIS 
I MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 5/1/931 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of George M. Grulke in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment has been mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following this nth day of May, 1991: 
Robert A. Echard 
Gridley, Echard & Ward 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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